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"Therefore no serious man will certainly ever write anything about any serious matter" (Plato)
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Plato
Seventh letter: writing is unwise; proven from the nature of things and language
For every thing there are three intermediates necessary to know it, a fourth is knowledge itself, as fifth one has to determine the thing itself, which can be known and is truly being. So we have:
| 1. Name |
| 2. Explanation of the concept |
| 3. Image |
| 4. Knowledge |
Take an example to make yourself understand what I mean and stick to it for everything: Let "circle", for instance, be the subject; what we just said is the name. - The explanation of the concept is the second, itself composed of names and verbs. "What is from its outer point in all directions equally far from the middle", could be the explanation of the concept, for which "round", "bent" and "circle" are names. - But the third is the drawn and erasable, the sketched and perishable. From that, the circle itself, the purpose of it all, is not affected, because its being is of a completely different nature. Fourth, knowledge and insight and true meaning is relevant. Again, all this should be considered by itself, not having its existence in sounds or physical forms but in the soul. - and precisely therefore it is clear that it should be distinguished from the nature of the circle itself, just as the earlier three. From all of them, this one is nearest in affinity and nature to the fifth: pure insight. The others are more remote.
This holds as well for the figure, straight or bent, the colour, the good and beautiful and just, for every artefact as well as everything originating in nature, for fire, water and things like that, for every living being, as well as in the area of the soul for propriety, and in general for al modes of functioning and suffering; for never will someone really acquire the knowledge of the fifth who did not get hold of these four in some way.
In addition to this, someone like that does not seek less, in
case of something being sometimes thus and sometimes thus, to express it, than
in case of something being - due to the weakness of reason. Therefore no one in
his senses will ever dare to fix what he intends, and certainly not in the
unchangeable fixated, as it is with what is written down.
But one should make clear to oneself once again in detail what I have just
explained. Every circle drawn or sketched in reality is full of the opposite of
the fifth -in every direction it may have straight parts- , but the circle
itself, we say, has nothing small or big, from the opposite essence in itself.
Neither does any name fix anything by itself, nothing prevents us from calling
"straight" what we are use to call "curved". And everything would be the same
under such a redefinition of terms.
Clearly, the same holds for the explanation of the concept, as it consists of names and verbs: nothing is fixed in a sufficiently unequivocal way.
We could pile up a large heap of arguments as to why all four are imprecise. But the most important, which we just said already, is there is two: being, and sometimes-being-thus-sometimes-thus. Though the soul strives to know not the sometimes-being-thus-sometimes-thus, but the being-what itself, the notorious four carry exactly to the soul what is not desired, they thus make, by arguments and appearances in reality, everything easily falsifyable what is said and shown, and thus fills everybody which embarrassment and confusion.
Now there is a lot with respect to which we are not used to seek
the truth, out of bad training, while we feel satisfied with the image we get
presented. In such cases we appear not to become ridiculous to one another, the
persons who are asked to those who pose the question, though the latter are
quite capable to dissect and falsify one of the four.
In those matters where we invite each other to answer the fifth and express it,
there the one who knows how to falsify achieves victory when he wants and can
give to the listening crowd the impression that the one who provides the answers
in speech or written form understands nothing of the matter about which he
undertook to talk or write. The listeners find that in such cases often not the
soul of the author or speaker is falsified, but the nature of the those four as
involved in the case, full as they are of flaws.
Despite all this, the resting and wandering of all those four, which concentrate themselves up and down then to this, then again to that, may in the end create knowledge of the genuine in those who have the right spirit. Those who have not, as is the state of the soul of most people with respect to learning and the so called formation of character, and also when someone gets spoiled, such a person could not even be brought to sight by Lynkeus. In a word, those who have no affinity to the matter from their own nature cannot make any learning capacity or thought relate to it. For it cannot enter an alien nature in the first place. Thus those who have no natural nearness and affinity to the just and all the beautiful, however much they may be able to grasp and memorise, and those who have the affinity but are unable to grasp and recall, will never understand the true knowledge of good and bad (as far as it is possible anyhow). For to understand both, they need to understand at the same time deceit and truth of being as a whole, with great strain during a longer time, as I already said in the beginning. But finally, when every single one of those four is tested against the other, names, explanations of concepts and observations, when they are all put to the test by attempts to falsify in an atmosphere of integrity, and when one trains, without pedantry, in questions and answers, suddenly such an insight and understanding will be ignited, as far as this, in general, is within man's range of possibilities.
Therefore no serious man will certainly ever write anything about any serious matter, thus exposing it to the people for their pedantry and confusion. It suffices to know the following criterion: when somebody reads written work of somebody else, be it in the form of laws of a governor, be it anything else, it will not be what the man is most serious about, where otherwise he may be taken serious, but that the highest at the most beautiful places that he possesses will remain hidden. But if some man would really write down these truly serious matters, "then they" -this time not the gods but the mortal- "have blurred his senses".